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BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
May
17, 1954
Chief Justice Earl Warren: These cases come
to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different
local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their
consideration together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro
race [called the plaintiffs]. through their legal
representatives. seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a
nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied
admission to schools attended by white children under laws
requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In each of the cases other than the Delaware
case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the
plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal"
doctrine announced by this Court in [the 1896 decision]
Plessy v. Ferguson Under that
doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided substantially equal
facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the
Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that
doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the
white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public
schools are not "equal" and cannot be made
"equal." and that hence they are deprived of the equal
protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the
question presented, the Court [agreed to hear the case].
Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard
this Term on certain questions [asked] by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and
opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some
light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are
faced. At best, they are inconclusive.
The most avid proponents of the post-[Civil]
War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments
and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive
nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated
schools, is the status of public education at that time. In the
South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by
general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white
children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education
of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the
race were illiterate.
In fact, any education of Negroes was
forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many
Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and
sciences as well as in the business and professional
world. It is true that public school education at the time of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the
Congressional debates.
Even in the North, the conditions of
public education did not approximate those existing today. The
curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common
in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in
many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually
unknown. As a consequence. it is not surprising that there
should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment
relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing
the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption,
the Court interpreted it as [prohibiting1 all state-imposed
discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of
"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in
this Court until 1896 in the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson.
involving not education but transportation. American courts have
since labored with the doctrine for over half a century
[Ed.'s italics]. In this
Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate
but equal' doctrine in the field of public education.
In Cumming v. County Board
of Education, and Gong Lum v Rice, the
validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more
recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was
found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were
denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications.
In none of these eases was it necessary to re-examine the
doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter; the Court expressly reserved decision on the question
whether
Plessy v. Ferguson should be held
inapplicable to public education.
In [these] cases, that question is directly
presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter; there
are findings [in lower State and Federal Courts] that the Negro
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications
and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"'
factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white
schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to
the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities. even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training. and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of
race, even though the physic~ facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal. deprive the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We
believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, in
finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not
provide them equal educational opportunities. This Court relied
in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school." in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students. again
resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability
to study. to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students. and, in general. to learn his profession." Such
considerations apply with added force to children in grade and
high schools.
To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone. The effect of this separation oil their educational
opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by
a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the
Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
Whatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason
of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such
segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Because these are class actions [where one
person represents a larger group], because of the wide
applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety
of local conditions, the formulation of decrees [orders of the
court] in these cases presents problems of considerable
complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate
relief [how to end school segregation] was necessarily
subordinated to the primary question - the constitutionality of
segregation in public education.
We have now announced that such segregation
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that
we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating
decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket [put on the
Court's calendar], and the parties are requested to present
further argument on [these issues] for the reargument this Term.
The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to
participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or
permitting segregation in public education will also be
permitted to appear as amici curiae [friends of the Court] upon
request to do so by September 15,1 954. and submission of
briefs by October 1,1954.
It is so ordered.
[In 1955 in the Brown II decision, the Court ordered that U.S.
public schools be desegregated with "all deliberate
speed."] * * *
* * Topeka, Kansas, 1950
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Linda Brown's school is five miles from
home. She had to cross a railroad yard and busy boulevard to
wait for a bus that would take her 20 blocks to all-black Monroe
Elementary in East Topeka. Her father wanted her in the nearest
public school, Sumner Elementary, just four blocks away. But
Linda is black, the school is for whites only. In Topeka
everything public is segregated, from drinking fountains to
swimming pools. Linda Carol Brown was seven years old when she
became the center of a major court battle that would set a
precedent for segregation laws everywhere.
Linda Brown and her new
class mates after Court decision |
After Linda's father tried unsuccessfully to enroll her in
the third grade in an all-white public school further away, he
teamed up with the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People to fight her unfair exclusion. *
* * * *
Segregation Stigmatizes The NAACP filed suit, but in August 1951
a three-judge federal panel threw out the case, ruling that although
segregation might be detrimental to Topeka's black children, it was
not illegal, since all Topeka schools had equal facilities and
programs.
This Kansas law suit, along with similar law
suits from Delaware, South Carolina and Virginia, were all compiled
under the heading of "Brown v. the Board of Education." The
momentous decision that was made two years later is still viewed as
one of the most important and significant rulings that the High Court
has made in the last century.
Special counsel Thurgood Marshall argued that segregation was
unconstitutional because it stigmatized African Americans, thereby
denying them the equal protection guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.
Chief Justice Earl Warren and a unanimous court agreed. In his
article "The Fight to Reverse Plessy," Raphael
Cassimere, Ph.D., argues that Linda Brown was never admitted to
the all white Topeka elementary school: http://www.tulane.edu/~so-inst/plessy4.html
* * * * *
Robert Russa Moton High School
Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. & Clarence Thomas Halt
Integration
|
Supreme Courts Halts
Racial Integration—“The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race,” he said. His
side of the debate, the chief justice said, was “more
faithful to the heritage of Brown,” the landmark 1954
decision that declared school segregation
unconstitutional. “When it comes to using race to assign
children to schools, history will be heard,” Chief
Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. . . . While Justices
Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined his opinion on the
schools case in full, the fifth member of the majority,
Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, did not. . . . Justice Kennedy
said achieving racial diversity, “avoiding racial
isolation” and addressing “the problem of de facto
resegregation in schooling” were “compelling interests”
that a school district could constitutionally pursue as
long as it did so through programs that were
sufficiently “narrowly tailored.” . . . “It is not often
in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much,”
Justice Breyer said. . . . “This is a decision that the
court and the nation will come to regret.” . . .
Justices
John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg signed Justice Breyer’s opinion.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion of his own,
as pointed as it was brief. Linda Greenhouse.
Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans for
Integration.
NYTimes |
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*
updated 23 July 2008
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