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Books by
James Cone
God of the Oppressed
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A Black Theology of Liberation /
For My People, Black Theology and the Black
Church
Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare (1992)
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Black Theology and Black Power
Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of
Liberation, 1968-1998 /
The
Spiritual and the Blues: An
Interpretation
Black Theology: A Documentary History: Volume Two: 1980-1992
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My Soul Looks Back
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Dialogue
on Black Theology
An Interview with James Cone
By William Hordern
Hordern : From the
point of view of the Christian church, one of the most
significant things to come out of the racial situation is black
theology. When that is mentioned, of course, we think of you,
Jim. You have moved us, angered us, and illuminated us. However,
many readers have problems with your work. They feel that,
because they were born with skin of the wrong color, you have
excluded them from dialogue. There seems to be some vagueness on
your use of the terms “white” and “black.” On the one
hand, in A Black Theology of Liberation, page 12, you say that
blackness symbolizes the oppressors and enslavement. In that use
a person with white skin may in fact be “black,” while a
person with black skin may be “white.” This definition of
terms is a healthy change from the usual symbolic meanings of
white and black.
But do you always follow
this definition? For example, you say on page 22
“unfortunately, American white theology has not been involved
in the struggle for black liberation.” If you are following
your first definition, this statement is true by definition
because any theology which had been involved in the struggle for
liberation would be “black.” Why then do you say
“unfortunately”/ It would appear that you are using “white
theology” here to describe theology as written by men whose
skins are white. But, if that is so, is the statement
universally correct?
Cone: The vagueness
of the terms “black” and “white” is intentional and I
think necessary. While I do not minimize the need for logical
consistency, there are times when rationalistic logic breaks
down. This is especially true when one is dealing with concrete
historical experiences that are not universal. There is the
situation of the oppressed as they reflect theologically upon
the significance of their oppression and liberation. Because
oppressors are the persons who devise the language tools for
communication, their canons of logic do not include a form of
the oppressed. “meaningful discourse” is always language
which does not threaten the powers that be.
If the oppressed are to
attain their freedom, they must begin to create a new style of
communication which is consistent with their struggle for
liberation. In part they must deny the accepted canons of logic,
allowing the liberation struggle alone to be the logical test
for meaningful discourse. Logical consistency, as defined by the
oppressors, is irrelevant.
Hordern: What I hear
you saying is that in A Black Theology of Liberation and
in your earlier Black Theology and Black Power you found
that, to be faithful to the black experience and to Christ’s
gospel, you had to be both literal and symbolic in your use of
“black” and “white.”
Cone: That is
correct. I do not apologize for the apparently vague use of the
terms. Rather I insist that the ambiguity is indispensable. In
this regard, I contend that theological language must be
paradoxical because of the necessity of affirming two dimensions
of reality which appear to be contradictory. For example, my
experience of being black-skinned means that I cannot
de-emphasize the literal significance of blackness. My
people were enslaved, lynched, and ghettoized in the name of God
and country because of their color. No amount of theologizing
can remove the reality of that experience from my consciousness.
And because blacks were dehumanized by white-skinned people who
created a cultural style based on black oppression, the literal
importance of whiteness has historical referents.
But that is only one aspect
of my experience. When I begin to investigate the particular
experience of blackness and whiteness in America, I begin to see
beyond it. Through my particular experience of blackness, I
encounter the symbolic significance of black existence and how
that existence is related to god’s revelation in Jesus Christ.
In the divine-human
encounter, the particular experience of oppression and
liberation, as disclosed in black-skinned people, is affirmed as
God’s own experience; and through that divine affirmation, I
encounter the universal meaning of oppression and liberation
that is not limited by skin color. The same is true for the
literal and symbolic meaning of whiteness, which has the
opposite meaning of blackness.
Hordern: In other
words, you believe that your critics want to move too quickly
from the particular to the universal. Once you have redefined
the symbolic meaning of white and black, the white-skinned
critic immediately wants to be called black.
Cone: That is
correct. The universal has no meaning independent of the
particular. When people move too rapidly to the universal,
they minimize the every experience which defines the universal.
Blackness then must, without qualification, refer to
black-skinned people who bear the scars of oppression; and
whiteness must refer to the people responsible for that
oppression. That is an must remain the starting point for all
talk about God and man in a society where color is the defining
point of humiliation. When this reality of the gospel and
historical experience is taken with utmost seriousness, then it
is possible to visualize the symbolic significance of blackness
and whiteness – but not before. To guars against the
easy, symbolic identification of white-skinned people with
black-skinned people, it is necessary to stress that there can
be no universal understanding of blackness without the
particular experience of blackness.
Hordern: To
paraphrase a question put to Jesus, who then can become black?
Cone: I contend that
if a white-skinned person is authentically black, then there is
no need to assure him of his authenticity. For to be black is to
know the ambiguity of the black experience, and this is true for
one who is literally black. The certainty of a person’s
affirmation of blackness is bound up with the struggle for
liberation, and that experience has its own ambiguities. I find
that the white-skinned person is worried too much about his own
“salvation,” rather than about the liberation of the black
community. I see no reason why I should spend time giving him
personal counsel on how to be black.
Hordern: In using
the term “black” to describe all oppressed people, do you
really speak to the need of oppressed people whose skins are of
other colors? For example, in North America today the Indian
people are taking pride in their history and are speaking of
“Red Power.” Is a black theology a help or a hindrance to
communicating with such people?
Cone: Whether black
theology is a help
or hindrance to other persons of color who are not black will
have to be decided by the victims who are red, brown, or
whatever color. I cannot answer that, but I hope they are not
excluded from my interpretation of the gospel. In my experience
with persons of color who are not Afro-American, they have not
raised difficulties with my choice of blackness.
I chose blackness because
of my experience and what that means in white America. I
do not contend that blackness is the appropriate term for all
historical situations of oppression and liberation. I only
contend that theology must be particular and thus
indigenous with the oppressed community so that universal
affirmations about liberation are relevant to the historical
experiences of the wretched of the land. “Red Power,”
“Brown Power” and the like do not conflict with “Black
Power.” They enhance the authenticity of black
self-determination and affirm that the black struggle for
freedom is not an isolated, discontinuous activity of God. That
is why I said in A Black Theology of Liberation: “The
focus on blackness does not mean that only blacks suffer as
victims in a racist society, but that blackness is an
ontological symbol and a visible reality which best describes
what oppression means in America” (p. 27). Therefore, I do not
insist that the concreteness of oppression is always and
everywhere black; but I do think that it is a distortion of
historical reality if one speaks of oppression in America
that ignores black people.
Hordern: In recent
years wide publicity has been given to an article titled “The
Student as Nigger.” This year a French Canadian wrote a book
in which he describes his people as “white niggers.” When
such groups, feeling oppressed, take the term “nigger” to
describe their oppression, do you feel that this is a
verification of your thesis that blackness is the ontological
symbol that best describes oppression in America? Or do you feel
there is something hypocritical about such groups’ referring
to themselves as “niggers”?
Cone: Authentic
identification with the oppressed involves more than adopting
the symbols of oppression. It means adopting their historical
experience, realizing that we cannot be unless oppression ceases
to be.
My difficulty with white
students is that they appropriate black symbols without
encountering the concrete experiences which gave rise to them.
They have not “paid the dues” which entitle them to use our
symbols. This is not to deny that white students are oppressed.
But they have not been enslaved legally and neither have they
undergone that peculiar experience that is called blackness. How
then can they say that they are “niggers” when that word has
definite historical referents about which they nothing? If white
students are to be “niggers,” the meaning of that term must
be conferred upon them by the black community. And I do not
think that we blacks are ready to do that.
Hordern: Your
theology has made a vital contribution by forcing us to
recognize that theology cannot be Christian unless it is
identified with the liberation of the oppressed. Hopefully,
never again will Christians be able to do theology without
remembering that Jesus himself put the release of captives high
on the list of his goals. But, in making this point, are you not
in danger of compressing the whole gospel into this one theme?
On page 23 of A Black Theology of Liberation you say,
“There can be no theology of the Gospel that does not arise
from an oppressed community.” And on page 91 you affirm that
without a condition of oppression there is no revelation and you
conclude: “His revelation is only for the paradoxical
conclusion that it is a good thing to have oppression because
without it there would be no revelation?
Cone: I am aware of
the problem of reductionism, the danger of compressing the
gospel into one theme. But that is the danger that must be
risked if I am to remain faithful to my understanding of the
Bible and the struggle of the oppressed for liberation. Indeed,
other theologies have taken similar risks. It could be said that
martin Luther compressed the gospel into the them of
“justification by faith because of grace,” and that in our
time Karl Barth reduced theology to Christology. Every theology
must take what he believes to be the central theme of the
biblical message and relate that theme to his historical
situation.
This does not mean that the
gospel changes every time a few theological emphasis appears. It
only means that Christian theology cannot be written once and
for all. There will always be the necessity to interpret the
meaning of the gospel in the light of changing situations with
new themes and emphases.
When a new theme appears it
does not mean that the old emphases are discarded, but that the
new datum enhances their significance. Black liberation is
the new datum. Theology must now ask, What is the essence of
the gospel in view of the oppressed of the land? What is good
news for the oppressed and humiliated, the weak and the
downtrodden? I contend that it is the good news of liberation.
The assertion that “the
gospel is liberation” is not an arbitrary statement. It is an
assertion of faith based on God’s revelation in history as
made known in the Exodus and the appearance of Jesus Christ.
Therefore, it is a distortion of the gospel and heretical if it
is said that Christians should place liberation high on the list
of goals. The concept of liberation is not one among many themes
in the biblical tradition; it is rather the essence of God’s
revelation in history, and other emphases should be interpreted
in light of liberation.
But you asked, Does not the
statement “His revelation is only for the oppressed of the
land” lead to the paradoxical conclusion that it is a good
thing to have oppression? I deny that conclusion. For this is
like saying that it is a good thing that Judas betrayed Jesus,
since the latter’s death was the only means of our redemption;
Judas therefore should be a saint.
To draw that conclusion is
equivalent to reducing divine revelation to logical
abstractions, which may be interesting to debate in a seminar on
philosophical logic but has nothing to do with human oppression
and liberation. God does not will that people should be
oppressed, and that was why he came in Jesus and why he is
present as Holy Spirit today. God’s stand against oppression
is his affirmation that all men have a common humanity in
freedom.
This means that I cannot be free until all men are
free. And if in some distant future I am no longer oppressed
because of blackness, then I must take upon myself whatever form
of human oppression exists in the society, affirming my identity
with the victims. The identity must be made with the victims not
because of sympathy, but because my own humanity is involved in
my brother’s degradation.
Source: The Christian Century (15 September 1971)
Bill Moyers and James Cone (Interview)
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update 28 July 2008
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